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ABSTRACT
Virtual Trusted Platform Modules (vTPMs) have been widely used
in commercial cloud platforms (e.g. Google Cloud, VMware Cloud,
and Microsoft Azure) to provide virtual root-of-trust for virtual
machines. Unfortunately, current state-of-the-art vTPM implemen-
tations are suffering from confidential data leakage and high per-
formance overhead. In this paper, we present SvTPM, a secure and
efficient software-based vTPM implementation based on hardware-
rooted Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), providing a whole
life cycle protection of vTPMs in the cloud. SvTPM offers strong
isolation protection, so that cloud tenants or even cloud admin-
istrators cannot get vTPM’s private keys or any other sensitive
data. In SvTPM, we identify and solve a couple of critical secu-
rity challenges for vTPM protection with SGX, such as NVRAM
replacement attack, rollback attacks, trust establishment, and a
fine-grained trusted clock. We implement a prototype of SvTPM on
both QEMU and KVM. Performance evaluation results show that
SvTPM achieves orders of magnitude of performance gains compar-
ing to the vTPMs protected with physical TPM. The launch time
of SvTPM is 2600× faster than vTPMs built upon hardware TPM.
In the micro-benchmarks evaluation, we find that the command
execution latency of SvTPM is smaller than or equal to the existing
schemes.
1 INTRODUCTION
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [19, 21, 37] is a physical chip
providing a complete set of standard APIs for key management, in-
tegrity measurement, and trust chain management. Many existing
software applications have been developed upon such an abstrac-
tion. However, in cloud computing platforms [1, 31], tons of virtual
machines may be running simultaneously on one physical machine.
As a result, it becomes inefficient to use one single hardware TPM
to provide a number of virtual machines with the aforementioned
security services due to low I/O performance of TPM hardware,
small Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM) space, and
a limited number of Platform Control Registers (PCRs).
To address this issue, Virtual Trusted Platform Modules (vTPMs)
are proposed to provide virtual root-of-trust for virtual machines in
commercial cloud platforms [30]. Instead of using physical NVRAM,
a vTPM uses a file, denoted as a NVRAM file, to hold secret keys.
Google [46], VMware [17] and Microsoft [34] have already adopted
vTPMs in their cloud platforms. Similar to a physical TPM chip, a
vTPM stores credentials for trust & identity, crypto operations and
integrity measurement. Accordingly, the security of vTPM itself is
crucial to cloud platforms and tenants [12, 29]. Unfortunately, how
to protect vTPM itself is still a challenging question.
State-of-the-art solutions. Currently, there are three methods to
protect a vTPM [5, 15, 24, 44]. The first method is TPM-based pro-
tection [5, 15] that uses a physical TPM to seal the NVRAM file
of a vTPM to bind the vTPM to the physical TPM and provision
static protection for TPM’s secret data. However, this method can-
not provide run-time protection for vTPM. Thus, malicious cloud
administrators may obtain sensitive data of vTPM through shared
memory. Meanwhile, it also incurs high I/O performance overhead
due to the low-speed performance of the physical TPM. The second
method [16] uses a tailored lightweight VM to support virtual TPM
functions. This method relies on VM isolation to provide security
separation. However, this method has three major limitations: (1)
It introduces high resources consumption because every virtual
machine has a paired vTPM virtual machine. (2) In addition, cloud
administrators may leak vTPM keys by accident or on purpose due
to the weak isolation. (3) The I/O performance is restricted because
it still needs to use the physical TPM as the root of trust. The third
method is SMM-based protection [24], which places the vTPM into
CPU System Management Mode (SMM) to achieve strong isolation.
This method has high performance overhead because entering the
SMM mode requires suspending all other CPU cores.
Key challenges. A promising alternative to existing solutions is to
use Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [25] to achieve TPM-chip-free
protection of vTPMs. The new vTPM solution with SGX protection
will no longer be plagued by the restriction of a physical TPM’s low
speed I/O ports. However, since the kind of trust provided by SGX
is very different from the kind of trust provided by a TPM chip,
using SGX to protect a vTPM is significantly more challenging than
only running the vTPM’s functions inside an enclave (i.e. private
regions of memory).
In particular, we observe that there are several critical security
challenges that need to be addressed when we put a software-based
TPM into an SGX enclave for strong isolation. To a large extent,
these security challenges are introduced by the differences between
the kind of trust provided by SGX and the kind of trust provided
by a TPM chip. For example, although a TPM chip is tamper-proof,
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the NVRAM file of a vTPM – when being protected by SGX – is
not really tamper-proof. The file can be replaced with another file
by a compromised hypervisor or a malicious cloud administrator.
(1) NVRAM Replacement Attacks. The NVRAM file is used to
store confidential data of a vTPM. It is needed to ensure
that the NVRAM file can only be accessed by a specific VM.
However, attackers and malicious tenants may replace the
NVRAM file of the vTPM to steal keys and data stored in the
NVRAM file.
(2) Trust Establishment between vTPM and SGX Platform. Pri-
vacy CA (PCA) cannot rely on the Endorsement Key (EK)
from TPM manufacturer to issue the Attestation Identity
Key (AIK) certificate for the vTPM because the vTPM EK is
generated by software instead of injecting into the TPM chip
at manufacturing time. Hence, how to extend trust from SGX
to vTPM so as to ensure the trust of TPM identity becomes
a key issue.
(3) Rollback Attacks of vTPM. The rollback function of vTPM
may be exploited by attackers to launch brute-force attacks.
Thus, we need to design a new protection mechanism to
prevent the rollback of sensitive values.
(4) Fine-grained Trusted Clock. Trusted time is associated with
lockout persistence and authorization management of TPM.
Although SGX Read Time-Stamp Counter (RDTSC) instruc-
tion is allowed in SGX2, its value can be manipulated by
the privileged software and thus cannot be trusted by the
enclave program. Moreover, providing a fine-grained secure
clock based on other hardware modules [35] suffers from
high performance overhead and weak security. Therefore,
how to provide accurate and secure clock values through
SGX is still a tough problem.
Our solution.We present SvTPM, a secure and efficient software-
based TPM, and propose the following methods to solve the above
challenges in SvTPM: (1) Designing a binding mechanism between
vTPMs and VMs to prevent the NVRAM replace attacks. Therefore,
the vTPM sensitive data and keys belonging to different VMs cannot
be accessed by each other, and only the authenticated VM can ac-
cess their unique NVRAM file; (2) Extending the trust from the SGX
platform to vTPM and establishing strong links between vTPMs
identity keys and SGX platform. It uses SGX Enhanced Privacy ID
(EPID) to quote vTPM EK and AIKs, thereby passing the trust rela-
tionship from SGX to vTPM; (3) Provisioning two solutions: global
software counter and SGX hardware counter, to defend against
rollback attacks to vTPM; and (4) Presenting a fine-grained trust
clock with Platform Service Enclave (PSE) to satisfy with TPM 2.0
requirements. Based on those approaches, SvTPM can provide se-
curity guarantees similar to that of a physical TPM chip for vTPMs
in the cloud.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we prototype
SvTPM base on both QEMU and KVM platforms with real Skylake
CPU and evaluate its performance. Evaluation results show that
SvTPM has much better performance than using physical TPM
chips while providing stronger isolation for vTPMs. Boot time for
NVRAM using SvTPM is 2600 times faster than using hardware
TPM. Execution of commands is also comparable with hardware
TPM. Compared with vTPMwithout SGX protection, SvTPM incurs
a small, barely noticeable performance degradation. Furthermore,
SvTPM is fully backward compatible, so that cloud tenants do not
need tomodify their applications and services when they use virtual
TPMs.
SvTPM is a practical solution that addresses the above key chal-
lenges while using SGX to protect vTPMs and then implements
secure software-based vTPMs for the cloud.
Our contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We identify security challenges for vTPM protection with
SGX, such as NVRAM replacement attacks, trust establish-
ment between vTPM and SGX Platform, rollback attacks to
vTPM, and fine-grained trusted clock.
• We propose SvTPM, a secure and efficient software-based
TPM, to provide vTPM run-time protection and strong isola-
tion based on SGX. In SvTPM, we design a binding mecha-
nism between vTPM and VM to prevent the NVRAM replace
attacks. In addition, we introduce an approach to establishing
trust between SGX and vTPM. Furthermore, we present two
rollback attack defense solutions and a fine-grained trusted
clock mechanism.
• We implement a prototype of SvTPM based on both QEMU
and KVM, and evaluate its performance. The prototype com-
prises 43,000 newly developed lines of code. Experimental
results show that SvTPM has a better performance than us-
ing a physical TPM while providing strong isolation and
secure protection for vTPMs in the cloud.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the background of Trusted Platform
Module, virtual Trusted Platform Module and SGX technologies
used in this work.
2.1 Trusted Platform Module and TPM 2.0
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [21, 23] is a hardware chip which
servers as trusted computing base. Users can use it to measure the
integrity of their system and keep sensitive files confidential. Nowa-
days, TPMs are provided in many commodity servers, desktops,
and laptops.
NVRAM file stores persistent state associated with TPM. Persis-
tent data includes root keys such as Endorsement Key (EK), Attesta-
tion Identity Key (AIK), Storage Root Key (SRK), state information
about a machine, measured values of a system and user’s keys,
which are generated based on the root keys. NVRAM file is con-
trolled by owners and can be configured to control read and write
capabilities separately. This means that only authorized users can
use or manage NVRAM files. However, storage space for NVRAM
files is limited so that it can not store a large amount of data.
TPM provides a set of PCRs to store measured values. When a
measurement is extended to a PCR, the value is hashed together
with the previously stored values in the PCR. Then the PCR is
updated with the hashed results. A small change will affect all
subsequent extension values. Also, specific PCR values can be re-
produced only when the same values are extended in the same order.
Thus updating the values in this way makes it easy to find integrity
violations in the current trust chain. In Trusted Computing Group
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(TCG) specification, there are 16 PCRs [3]. And users can measure
key modules and store measured values to these PCRs.
TPM often uses Low Pin Count (LPC) bus to transmit data.
Though some TPM 2.0 chips support I2C and PCI, these protocols
are still hard to meet standards of high-speed concurrent encryption
and decryption operations.
Currently, TCG has released TPM 2.0 specification [19, 20], which
follows ISO standard (i.e. ISO/IEC 11889:2015). Compared with TPM
1.2, TPM 2.0 has many advantages. (1) TPM 1.2 only has one hier-
archy in storage. TPM 2.0 has three persistent hierarchies. It has
hierarchy in platform, storage, and endorsement. Each of these
hierarchies owns at least one root of trust, such as Endorsement Pri-
mary Seed (EPS), Storage Primary Seed (SPS) and Platform Primary
Seed (PPS). Additionally, TPM 1.2 only supports SHA-1 and RSA,
while TPM 2.0 supports all kinds of cryptography algorithms. TPM
2.0 includes an algorithm identifier that allows TPM to use any
algorithm design without changing its specifications. Hence, TPM
2.0 can be easily integrated with various cryptography algorithms,
such as Chinese Commercial Cryptography algorithms, SM2, SM3,
and SM4. TPM owns and generates different types of keys. Among
these keys, EK is an identity key of TPM. In TPM 1.2, there is only
one EK, which is built within the chip and cannot be modified. In
TPM 2.0 specification, it has multiple keys (i.e. EK, AIK, SK, Signing
Key (SIGK), Binding Key (BK), Authentication Key (AK) and Legacy
Key (LK)). EK is initially generated by TPM chip manufacturer. It
can be regenerated by the platform manufacturer and platform
owner. In other words, original EK could be updated to newer EK
versions.
In addition, TPM 2.0 unifies the way in which entities in TPM are
authorized. Besides traditional password and HMAC authentication
methods, authentication method based on policy authorization is
added. It allows multiple policies to be used. This enhances the
security of the keys. Moreover, TPM 2.0 also enhances its robustness.
In the TPM 2.0 specification, important data can be sealed to a PCR
value approved by a particular signer.
2.2 vTPM
vTPM [5] is a virtual TPM mainly used in cloud platform which
serves as root-of-trust for virtual machines. vTPM service in Xen
is designed as a set of secure, stand-alone domains managed by
the hypervisor. Each of these domains has a mini-OS and their
dedicated functions. Each domain ( i.e. virtual guest) has a software-
simulated TPM running in the vTPM domain called DOMU. vTPM
manager runs in a privileged domain called DOM0, where DOM0 is
responsible for the creation and management of the vTPM instances
and establishing interaction between vTPMs and a physical TPM.
The vTPM based on QEMU-KVM is implemented with two
modes, TPM passthrough mode, and full vTPM mode. In TPM
passthrough mode, hardware TPM is exposed to a virtual machine
in the form of a virtual TPM instance. All operations of this vir-
tual TPM instance are passed to the underlying TPM hardware.
And the hardware TPM does all computing and storage work. Full
vTPM mode provides a virtual machine with a vTPM implemen-
tation that is completely detached from the physical TPM. In this
approach, TPM functions are implemented by designing software
TPM backend and the externally linked Libtpms.
Our work focuses on the implementation of full vTPMs mode
in QEMU-KVM architecture. In this architecture, KVM works as
virtualization infrastructure for the Linux kernel, which turns Linux
kernel into a hypervisor. QEMU is responsible for device emulation,
which emulates hardware devices for VMs. VM sends TPM requests
to QEMU, which hands them over to vTPM devices emulated by
QEMU. Libtpms implements functions of TPM as a comprehensive
software library. vTPM leverages Libtmp library for its functionality
implementation. vTPM calls APIs of libtpms. Libtpms processes the
requests, then returns the results to QEMU, which is then passed to
VM via TPM driver. An NVRAM file stores important state informa-
tion of the vTPM, including keys and PCR values. The advantage
of this architecture is that it supports multiple virtual machine
instances and easy migration functionality of these virtual machine
instances. However, the security of vTPM cannot be guaranteed
due to lacking hardware isolated environment.
2.3 Software Guard Extensions
SGX [11, 26, 27] is a set of instructions and mechanisms for memory
accesses added to Intel CPU processors. It provides enclaves to
ensure confidentiality and integrity of key applications.
Enclave. Enclave is an SGX based trusted execution environ-
ment for applications. Code and data in the enclave reside in a
protected physical memory area called enclave page cache (EPC).
Accesses to the code and data in enclaves are protected by SGX
access control mechanism. When loaded into DRAM, data in the
EPC page is protected by the granularity of one cache line. On-
chip memory encryption engine encrypts and decrypts cache lines
written to and extracted from the DRAM. Also, the integrity of
enclave memory is guaranteed, which means that memory modifi-
cations and rollbacks can be detected. The non-enclave code cannot
access enclave memory, while enclave code could access external
untrusted DRAM.
Enclave life cycle. An enclave is created when ECREATE in-
struction is processed. In this process, a free EPC page is allocated as
SGX enclave control structure (SECS). Then the EADD instruction
associates this allocated page to the enclave. SGX records which
pages are associated with which enclave by their virtual address and
permissions of the pages. Then SGX performs security checkings for
page access permission checking and page allocation checking. Af-
ter success allocation of enclave pages, EINIT instruction generates
secure hashes for remote attestation. After instances in enclaves
are finished, EREMOVE instruction is executed to de-allocate the
EPC pages.
Performance overhead. Performance overhead is introduced
when code is executed in enclaves in three scenarios as follows. (1)
Since privileged instructions cannot be executed within the enclave,
threads must exit the enclave before the system call. The enclave
transition needs to perform a series of check and update, including
TLB refreshes, which incurs performance overhead. (2) Because
the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) must encrypt and decrypt
the cache line, overhead for writing memory and caches misses
is introduced. (3) Page swapping between EPC and unprotected
DRAM is expensive because the confidentiality and integrity of the
evicted EPC pages and the freshness of the pages brought back to
EPC should be guaranteed. In order to avoid address translation, it
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is necessary to interrupt all enclave threads and refresh the TLB.
These interruptions introduce performance overheads.
3 MOTIVATIONS AND SECURITY
CHALLENGES
In the cloud, functions supported by SGX abstraction library is
not comparable to that of TPM module even though SGX provides
attestation and several similar features as TPM. This is mainly due
to the following reasons:
(1) SGX supports the protection for specific applications instead
of their execution environment. It utilizes enclaves for isola-
tion between applications, rather than between applications
and the execution environment they are executing on.
(2) Memory of EPC page provided by SGX is limited, which
is restricted to 128M [6]. When available EPC pages are
insufficient, least recently used EPC pages are swapped to
available ones. During the swapping stage, EPC pages are
transferred into untrusted DRAM pages. These pages’ virtual
addresses are beyond address range of Processor Reserved
Memory (PRM). During this transferring process, memory
encryption and decryption and TLB flush are involved. Thus,
very high performance overhead incurs.
(3) SGXhas limited support for security services and user-friendly
APIs, such as key management, crypto operations, random
number generation operations, and secure storage functions.
Thus, the diversity of cryptography algorithms becomes a
straggler for sharing security services [42].
In SvTPM, our goal is to build a system, which supports secure
vTPMs with high performance using SGX. Our SvTPM provides a
secure virtual TPM for cloud users. With the vTPM, users can verify
the trust of key modules in virtual machines, reuse existing services
(e.g. BitLocker), and implement a variety of personalized security
services. However, we have identified many security challenges
that need to be solved to implement a secure and efficient virtual
TPM with SGX in cloud.
3.1 NVRAM Replacement Attacks
vTPM does not have the physical NVRAM of TPM chips so that
each vTPM needs a unique protected file to store its sensitive data.
The file in the host representing the flash of the hardware TPM
is used to store the vTPM’s persistent information, such as seeds,
keys and PCRs, which is called NVRAM. Since NVRAM stores the
confidential data of vTPM, its security is crucial to cloud platform.
However, software systems are naturally different from hardware
systems, it is necessary to consider any potential security issues
caused by software implementations in SvTPM. We have identified
the following security requirements that NVRAM needs to meet
in SvTPM to achieve a similar security strengths provided by the
hardware TPM:
(1) Data stored in the NVRAM files must be encrypted and
securely stored;
(2) NVRAMfiles cannot be accessed by the other enclaves except
their owners;
(3) The NVRAM file of a vTPM can only be accessed by an
authorized VM.
vTPM servers as root-of-trust of VM instances. SvTPM needs
to provide a unique vTPM for each VM of a cloud. In the cloud, it
must ensure that the NVRAM can only be accessed by the specific
VM, thus preventing confidentiality leaks. However, an attacker
can replace the NVRAM file and legally launch the vTPM so as to
steal the user’s credentials. Hence, how to protect the NVRAM and
prevent NVRAM replace attacks is a key challenge for SvTPM.
3.2 Trust Establishment between vTPM and
SGX platform
Another key problem for SvTPM is the establishment of the trust
between vTPM and SGX Platform. TPM performs some authentica-
tion operations using the attestation identity key (AIK). TPM needs
to interact with the PCA to obtain an AIK certificate before using
the AIK. The privacy CA will issue AIK certificates based on EK
certificates issued by the hardware manufacturer to TPM. Since
the EK certificate is generated by TPM manufacturer, this certifi-
cate can provide identification for TPM. Different from hardware
TPM, SvTPM is implemented by software. Thus, the following two
questions need to be answered in SvTPM:
• Where to obtain the EK certificate of vTPM?
• What are requirements for issuing the EK certificate?
In a software-based vTPM, it lacks trusted EK and AIK. The EK
and AIK are generated by the software. Hence how to rely on SGX
platform to establish a trust relationship between vTPM and SGX
so as to ensure the trusted identity of the vTPM is another challenge.
3.3 Rollback Attacks to vTPM
The rollback operation is a basic function provided by the cloud
platforms for users. A user can take a snapshot of a VM in advance
and then restore the VM to the previous state after an exception
occurs. For vTPM architecture, the data and states of vTPMs also
need to be rollbacked when VMs are rollbacked. Otherwise, it will
cause that the state of vTPM and VM is inconsistent. This feature
provides a great convenience for users, but it also means that the
VM environment of a cloud platform is different from the physi-
cal machine [13, 32, 45]. For the SvTPM, adversaries may use the
rollback function to threaten the password security of the SvTPM.
FailedTries in TPM, for example, is used to prevent dictionary
attacks against TPM. Many of the functions in the TPM require
a user to authorize and, if the key entry is incorrect, the value
of failedTries will increase depicted in Figure 1. When a thresh-
old value is reached, the TPM enters the locked state. In a cloud
platform, if malicious users use the rollback function to rollback
SvTPM after SvTPM triggers the lock, they can bypass the pro-
tection strategy and successfully launch a brute-force password
attack on SvTPM. Hence, it is a challenge to design a new protec-
tion mechanism to prevent the rollback of sensitive values in vTPM.
3.4 Fine-grained Trusted Clock
There are two reasons why TPM needs a trusted clock. First, TPM
needs to measure the lockout duration for some specific attacks.
For example, TPM is required to implement a lockout mechanism
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Figure 1: Process of Rollback Attack.
to protect against so-called "dictionary attacks", where an attacker
tries numerous passwords until one succeeds. If passwords are
entered incorrectly more than n times during the authentication
process, the TPM enters the lockout state and refuses any service
for a pre-determined period of time. Second, the trusted clock can
be used for time-stamped authorizations, such as creating a valid
authentication for a pre-defined period of time. For example, the
TPM can create a key valid for a day, which will become unusable
when the timer expires.
TPM 2.0 specification requires a clock with millisecond granu-
larity. Then, a TPM can use such a clock to measure intervals of
time for lockouts and time-bound authorizations.
Unlike TPM chips, vTPM lacks the hardware clock. We want to
provision the hardware clock based on SGX, but SGX does not also
have a hardware clock. SGX RDTSC (i.e. read time-stamp counter)
instruction provides secure clocking service, which is not permitted
in the enclavemode in SGX1. Although this instruction is allowed in
SGX2, its values can be manipulated by the privileged software and
thus cannot be trusted by the enclave program. Moreover, providing
a secure clock based on other auxiliary hardware modules [35], is
limited to the specific architecture and low performance. Therefore,
how to provide a fine-grained trusted clock through SGX becomes
a challenge.
4 OUR APPROACH
In this section, we describe our threat model, design goals and the
architecture of SvTPM.
4.1 Threat Model
We consider a powerful adversary who has superuser access to
systems and physical hardware. Software, including OS, SeaBIOS,
and other system software are not trusted. However, considering
the management of virtual machines is controlled by hypervisors in
the cloud, we assume hypervisors are benign-but-vulnerable, while
they may be subjected to bugs.
We only trust CPU and the code running in an enclave. We
assume that the adversary is unable to subvert cryptographic prim-
itives correctly implemented and is unable to subvert the security
guarantees of SGX on any machines. However, we assume that
attackers have the abilities to do the following things:
• Analyze source code to determine sensitive data structures,
and then directly analyze NVRAM that stores vTPM non-
volatile data to obtain sensitive data;
• with root privileges, use dynamic debugging and tracking
program execution process to find sensitive data during VM
running;
• Change and replace the NVRAM file path associated with a
VM at startup to access NVRAM information belonging to
other vTPM;
• Take a snapshot and rollback the states of VMs and vTPMs,
and conduct rollback attacks.
Side-channel attacks [10, 18, 33] on SGX are out of scope of our
threat model. However, a number of solutions have been recently
proposed to mitigate such attacks [9, 22, 38, 39].
4.2 Design Goals
To address the above security challenges, we propose SvTPM, which
is an SGX-based vTPM system. The design goals of SvTPM are
articulated as follows:
• Minimize the changes of the existing vTPM architecture so
that cloud tenants do not need to modify their applications
and services when they use virtual TPMs;
• Protect the confidentiality and integrity of the vTPM in run-
time from information leaking and data tampering;
• Ensure the secure storage of sensitive files of vTPM (i.e.
NVRAMfiles), and prevent files from being accessed illegally;
• Establish a one-to-one binding relationship betweenNVRAM
files and VMs to mitigate NVRAM replacement attacks;
• Prevent credentials of vTPM from being leaked when hyper-
visors are comprised;
• Minimize performance overhead and achieve a higher access
speed than physical TPMs.
4.3 High-Level Architecture of SvTPM
A high-level architecture of SvTPM is shown in Figure 2. It includes
the following major components: SvTPM enclave instances, SvTPM
2.0 backend interface, SeaBIOS, and Tpm2driver. The SvTPM en-
clave includes the Libtpms 2.0 library and the NVRAM of a vTPM,
which are sealed and isolated in an SGX enclave. The SvTPM 2.0
backend interface is responsible for creating SvTPM enclave in-
stance, providing command processing interface, etc. SeaBIOS is a
virtual BIOS serving for guest OSes. The TPM2driver module pro-
vides the frontend interfaces to access virtual TPMs. In SvTPM, each
virtual machine (VM) is provided with a unique SvTPM enclave
instance to implement a secure vTPM.
When a VM get started, QEMU is responsible for initializing its
devices. At this stage, an SvTPM device is initialized. Meanwhile,
SvTPMgenerates an enclave for the vTPM andmakes sure the vTPM
initialization instruction is safely executed within the enclave. The
enclave has the same lifetime as the VM is only destroyed if the VM
is shut down or restarted. When a user executes a TPM command
with TSS (TPM Software Stack) in the VM, it is passed to QEMU,
which is responsible for passing the command to the enclave, where
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Figure 2: High-Level Architecture of SvTPM. Four main
components are highlighted: (1) SvTPM enclave instances;
(2) SvTPM 2.0 backend interface; (3) SeaBIOS; and (4)
Tpm2driver.
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Figure 3: Trusted Modules in SvTPM Enclave.
specific instructions are safely executed and results are returned
by the enclave to QEMU, which then returns to the upper driver.
Due to the limited memory size of SGX EPC, we need put the
key modules of the vTPM to the SvTPM enclave that is divided into
two logical parts: the trusted part and the untrusted part depicted
in Figure 3. The trusted part is used to perform confidential oper-
ations (such as key generation, crypto operations, etc.), to store
sensitive data, and to solve security challenges. Its code and data
are protected in the SGX enclave. In SvTPM system, the trusted
parts include the Libtpms library, NVRAM files, Intel SGX SSL, and
four security modules, which are responsible for confidential oper-
ations. The untrusted parts help with non-confidential operations.
Code and data of untrusted parts are not protected by SGX. For
SvTPM, the untrusted parts include TPM_tis, vTPM backend inter-
face, system_call, and SeaBIOS. The trusted parts and the untrusted
parts cannot directly interact with each other. In order to securely
communicate between the trusted parts and the untrusted parts, we
need to define the interface file between them, which is called the
EDL file. The EDL file defines OCALL function where the untrusted
parts call the trusted parts and ECALL function where the trusted
parts call the untrusted parts.
Libtpms 2.0, the shared library, is the key trusted module of
SvTPM. It can provide all the features and command sets for TPM
2.0. Libtpms 2.0 consists of a command set module, a crypto engine
module, an authorization module, and an NV module. The com-
mand set module implements various commands defined in the
TPM 2.0 specification. The authorization module implements En-
hanced Authorization (EA) of TPM 2.0, which manages all objects
or entities of the TPM (including the TPM’s hierarchies) and the
authorization policies associated with them. The NV module imple-
ments NVRAM file operation, such as creating, resetting, reading,
and writing, and other NV operations. The crypto engine module
packages the implementation of the encryption and decryption
algorithms provided by the TPM and implements them through the
calling interface provided by OpenSSL. However, due to the enclave
mechanism, OpenSSL cannot be used directly, but Intel provides
the Intel SGX SSL library for use.
Since the Libtpms 2.0 modules support core functions of the
system, its code and data need to be protected. Whenever QEMU
creates a VM, it first creates an enclave through SGX and loads
Libtpms 2.0 into the enclave for isolation. After loading Libtpms 2.0,
enclave measures hash of Libtpms 2.0 to verify its integrity. If its
integrity is not compromised, the Libtpms 2.0 code runs in the EPC.
With SGX’s physical memory isolation protection and memory
access control mechanism, it can ensure that other software, includ-
ing privileged software, cannot access enclave data. Meanwhile,
data in EPC pages are encrypted by the memory encryption engine.
This data can only be obtained through hardware memory attacks.
Therefore, this mechanism protects the vTPM memory code and
data at run-time.
TheNVRAMfile is the other trusted component of SvTPM,which
stores keys, PCR values, seeds, and other private data. When a
vTPM device is created, the NVRAM file will also be created. Since
the important data of the vTPM is stored in the NVRAM file, its
secure storage is crucial for the security of the vTPM. Whenever
the vTPM performs a command operation, SvTPM will update the
corresponding data to the NVRAM file to save the state of the vTPM
and then uses SGX sealing operation to seal it to disk. When data
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is needed, the NVRAM file sealed on the disk will be first unsealed
and then loaded into the EPC for usage.
We add four security modules in the SvTPM enclave, which are
NVRAM protection module, trust establishment module, rollback
protection module, and trust clock module. With these security
components, we address the security threats mentioned above,
such as NVRAM replacement attacks, trust establishment between
vTPM and SGX platform, rollback attacks to vTPM, and trusted
clock. The following sections provide in-depth details of these four
security modules.
4.4 NVRAM Protection
In SvTPM, we use the seal mechanism of SGX to encrypt the data
stored in NVRAM files that can also ensure that the NVRAM files
cannot be accessed by the other enclaves except their owners. SGX’s
seal mechanism utilizes AES-GCM to encrypt data and provides
two key derivation policies, KEYPOLICY_MRENNCLAVE and KEY-
POLICY_MRSIGNER. KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE and KEYPOL-
ICY_MRSIGNER use the enclave measurement and signer mea-
surement registers to derive the keys, respectively. In SvTPM, we
choose to use the KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER key derivation policy
to meet the requirements of NVRAM secure storage and NVRAM
isolation. The enclaves for vTPMs have different seal keys.
For the NVRAM replacement attack, the fundamental cause is
the lack of strong binding between VM and NVRAM. As mentioned
above, data stored in NVRAM in the SvTPM architecture is the
result of seal operation. After the seal operation, all the data stored
in NVRAM is encrypted. If a user’s enclave can be signed with his
or her secret key during the enclave generation phase, the KEYPOL-
ICY_MRSIGNER key derivation policy makes each NVRAM sealed
by a separate key. This key derivation policy satisfies the require-
ments of secure storage and isolation, but it is still not sufficient to
establish a binding relationship between the VMs and NVRAMs. An
attacker who can replace the NVRAM enclave file can still achieve
the NVRAM replacement attack if the corresponding enclave file is
replaced at the same time.
Aiming at defending NVRAM replacement attacks, establishing
a binding relationship between VM and NVRAM file is necessary. If
a VM can access another VM’s NVRAMfile, many of the persistence
data in NVRAM belonging to one VM can be replaced by another.
The software applications that rely on NVRAM persistence data are
prone to such attacks. In a physical machine, the binding relation-
ship between the physical machine and the TPM chip is determined
by the physical connection. This connection relationship enables
the TPM chip to be capable of being independent of the physical
machine and can provide proof of identity to the physical machine.
In the software implementation, we need additional mechanisms
to implement the binding relationships due to the absence of this
physical binding relationship.
In order to solve the problem of binding VM and vTPM. We
design a binding scheme for signing VM images and enclave based
on the user’s private key. When a user creates a virtual machine
with a virtual TPM, we ask the user to generate her/his own unique
key pair and then use that key pair to sign the user-specific enclave
file. After this step, we can ensure that a separate key is obtained
after using the KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER key derivation strategy
Enclave 
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IAS
Quoting
Enclave
SvTPMn
EK
AIK
EPID
Quote
Figure 4: Trust Establishment.
to ensure the isolation between NVRAMs of different users. In ad-
dition, we will use this key to sign the image file of the VM and
check the integrity of the VM image when the VM is powered on.
Through the above two protection strategies, we can establish a
binding relationship between the VM image and the NVRAM file.
In addition to establishing the binding relationship between VM
and NVRAM, we also design a binding verification scheme based on
a remote third-party. When the vTPM starts up, after the NVRAM
is properly unsealed, its identity information is passed to the cloud
platform through the trusted channel. When the VM is started, the
vTPM measures the VM and sends the measurement of the VM
to the cloud platform after the measurement process ends. When
the cloud receives two pieces of information, it compares the en-
clave’s measurements with the VM’s measurements and determines
whether the binding relationship is correct.
4.5 Trust Establishment
In the vTPM architecture based on hardware TPM, AIK from hard-
ware TPM and TPM quote operation can be used to bind the EK
certificate of vTPM to the underlying hardware platform. The quote
operation of TPM signs the EK of vTPM with the current state of
PCRs and the hash of EK. PCRs hold state information of software
and hardware of the platform, hence this operation is equivalent to
bind EK of vTPM with the underlying platform. Since we no longer
use hardware TPM in SvTPM, we need to investigate SGX-based
alternatives for SvTPM.
Let’s first consider the security features provided by SGX itself.
SGX provides integrity and confidentiality for enclaves [28]. If
we put a vTPM in an enclave, it means the vTPM is measured
for integrity on startup and cannot be influenced by malicious
interference at run-time. This shows that we have narrowed the
vTPM attack to the vTPM code and SGX mechanism itself. As long
as we can ensure the security of both, we can trust the vTPM.
After the above analysis, we define the following two conditions
for issuing EK certificates: (1) vTPM runs on SGX; and (2) Enclave
measurement value of vTPM is invariant.
To satisfy those two conditions, we provide a trust establishment
solution depicted in Figure 4. When a PCA ( Privacy CA ) needs to
issue an AIK certificate for a vTPM, it, as a challenger, first remotely
attests the vTPM. In this scenario, SGX attestation key will generate
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a signature based on the Enclave’s MRENCLAVE and the hash value
of vTPM EK. Then, the enclave of vTPM requests Quoting enclave
for SGX signature. The Quoting enclave generates EPID to sign
the vTPM values. The signature values from the Quoting enclave is
then sent to the PCA. PCA verifies the signature by Intel Attestation
Service (IAS). When the verification succeeds, it provides us two
pieces of information: the vTPM is running on hardware SGX;
and the integrity of the enclave where the vTPM is located is not
comprised. As long as both of these conditions are satisfied, the
vTPM can be proved to be within the security boundary, and the
privacy CA can issue a certificate for it.
4.6 Rollback Attacks Prevention
To mitigate the rollback attack on vTPMs, we propose the following
two defense mechanisms based on software and hardware, respec-
tively:
• Software-based mechanism. As shown in Figure 5, we
design a synchronization mechanism to synchronize the
non-rollback data in SvTPM. With this scheme, the rollback
attack against vTPM can be defeated by ensuring that the
rollback operation cannot affect the non-rollback data in
SvTPM. As an example of the FailedTries mentioned above,
we add a Global_Failedtries value outside the rollback space
of vTPM status, which is not affected by the rollback op-
eration. This value is synchronized using the FailedTries
value in the normal operation of vTPM. However, when the
rollback operation occurs, because this value is not affected
by the rollback operation, FailedTries can be synchronized
using this value at the end of the rollback operation to en-
sure that FailedTries in vTPM space are not affected by the
rollback operation.
• Hardware-basedmechanism. As is shown in Figure 6, we
use hardware monotonic counters provided by Intel ME to
represent non-rollback data like FailedTries in vTPM. When
vTPM is first initialized, we use the sgx_create_monotonic
_counter() function provided by SGX SDK (i.e. Intel ME) to ap-
ply the monotonic counter, which returns a Counter_UUID.
We need to save this value in NVRAM for further manipula-
tion. When a vTPM needs to operate on FailedTries, we use
the previously saved Counter_UUID to access andmodify the
hardware counter. SGX provides three access strategies for
the monotonic counter: the first one has the same signature
key; the second is an enclave that has the same measurement
value; and the third is an enclave that has the same signature
key and the measurement value. This access policy ensures
that the hardware monotonic counters used by SvTPM are
not affected by the enclaves created by an external malicious
party. In addition, due to the limited number of hardware
counters, 256 in total, we provide an additional interface
for users to destroy SGX hardware counters to prevent the
abuse of SGX hardware counters.
Both of the above solutions can solve the rollback attack problem,
and both have advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of the
software-based solution is that it can prevent the rollback attack
at less cost. Since our software program is implemented primarily
through a couple of synchronous operations, it only adds a few
synchronized statements to the original and barely increases the
performance overhead. The disadvantage of the software-based
solution is that if the synchronization process is maliciously inter-
rupted, the protection strategy can be bypassed. If the synchroniza-
tion process is interrupted before Golbal_FailedTries synchronizes
FailedTries, FailedTries will incorrectly stay in the state of the previ-
ous snapshot, causing it to be rolled back incorrectly. The advantage
of the hardware-based solution is that it does not have the problem
of data being rolled back due to an interruption in the middle of
the rollback in the software scheme. Because the essence of the
hardware-based solution is to isolate the non-rollback data from
the NVRAM and put it into the SGX monotonic counter, it cannot
be affected by external software operations. Even if it is interrupted
in the middle of the rollback operation, its data cannot be rolled
back, because the SGX monotonic counter will not be affected.
Meanwhile, there are three main disadvantages of the hardware-
based solution: (1) There is a significant performance penalty associ-
ated with the operation of a hardware SGX counter; (2) In the TPM
specification, FailedTries values are reduced after a certain recovery
time, but we cannot simulate this situation after using hardware
monotonic counters to represent the FailedTries values because
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SGX does not provide an interface for diminishing monotonic coun-
ters. In this case, we must modify the relevant semantics in the
TPM specification. When FailedTries return to 0, the SGX counter
is destroyed and reapplied; and (3) Reapplying the SGX counter can
inevitably lead to the change of Counter_UUID. If the snapshot is
taken before the change of Counter_UUID and recovered after that
change, the SGX counter cannot be accessed.
Both solutions for addressing the rollback attack problem have
trade-offs, and users can choose a suitable scheme according to their
own usage scenarios. For example, if users have high-performance
requirements, they can choose the software-based mechanism; if
users are not sensitive to performance and do not have additional
protection policies to ensure the continuity of rollback operations,
they can choose the hardware-based mechanism.
4.7 Fine-grained Trusted Clock
The construction of SvTPM requires a trusted clock, which unfortu-
nately cannot be supported directly by SGX enclaves. In this section,
we present a solution to address such a problem.
SGX can obtain trusted clock functions through the SGX Plat-
form Service [7]. The Platform Service Enclave (PSE) can provide
a timer with the Protected Real-Time Clock (PRTC) of Converged
Security and Management Engine (CSME) to application enclaves.
This trusted time service can be used by an application enclave
running on an offline platform to track the amount of time passed
since a previous reading of the timer. It also returns a nonce, which
is trusted according to Intel standards as long as the nonce does not
change. However, this trusted clock service provides clock values in
seconds relative to the reference point. This is inconsistent with the
millisecond granularity requirement of the TPM 2.0 specification.
The SGXRDTSC instruction provides nanosecond-granular times-
tamp counters. However, the SGX RDTSC instruction is not per-
mitted in the enclave mode of SGX1. Although this instruction is
allowed in the enclave mode of SGX2, its values can be manipu-
lated by the privileged software and thus cannot be trusted by the
enclave program. Thus, we cannot use the SGX RDTSC instruction
as a secure clock in SvTPM.
In our approach, we combine the coarse-grained PRTC with a
fine-grained software clock. The software clock is implemented by
running a separate software thread inside the same enclave, which
executes in a loop and increments a counter at a constant rate. We
adopt the method proposed by Chen et. al. [10] to realize such a
software clock. Therefore, in SvTPM, when a coarse-grained clock
is required, we only leverage the trusted clock values through the
PSE. When a fine-grained clock is needed, we launch a software
thread that generates a fine-grained clock inside the enclave and
periodically checks the PRTC to correct its values.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our approach with the following major
goals:
• Evaluating the performance of SvTPM when it is launched.
We tested the NVRAM launch time (Figure 7).
• Evaluating and analyzing the performance of SvTPM when
creating the RSA key. The results are shown in Figure 8.
• Evaluating the performance of SvTPM in some TPM com-
mon commands, such as seal, unseal, sign, signature verifi-
cation, encrypt, decrypt, PCR read, and PCR extend. These
operations basically cover the common operations of the
TPM (Figures 9, 10, and 11).
• Demonstrating the performance of SvTPM in practical appli-
cations. As shown in Figure 12, we tested the performance
of SvTPM in BitLocker encryption and decryption.
• Evaluating the resource consumption of SvTPM. We com-
pared the memory usage of vTPM in XEN and SvTPM (Fig-
ure 13).
5.1 Experiment Environment
We implement SvTPM, and in this section we describe how we
evaluate its performance and discuss evaluation results. Our exper-
imental environment was set up on an E3 server with Intel Xen
e3-1280 v6 CPU and 16GB of memory. The model of hardware TPM
in our experimental environment is NATIONZ TPM 2.0. Our host
operating system is Ubuntu 18.04, SGX SDK version is 2.3, QEMU
version is 2.6.0, and the SeaBIOS version is 1.10.0. The operating
system version of the VM is ubuntu 14.04, and its memory is 2GB.
The number of new lines of code added for developing SvTPM is
over 43,000.
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Figure 7: NVRAMLaunchTime. TheNVRAM launch time of
SvTPM is about 2600+ times faster than that of vTPMs built
upon hardware TPM.
5.2 NVRAM Launch Time
In this vTPM architecture based on hardware TPM, the first load
of NVRAM needs to decrypt the encrypted key of NVRAM with
TPM device in the host machine, and then decrypt NVRAM with
the key. In the SGX-based SvTPM architecture, NVRAM encryption
and decryption are replaced by SGX’s seal and unseal operations.
We have tested the NVRAM launch time in the above two differ-
ent architectures for 100 times. Experimental results are shown in
Figure 7. The NVRAM launch time spent by the SGX-based SvTPM
architecture is about 0.015ms, while the vTPM architecture based
on hardware TPM took 267ms to launch NVRAM file. In contrast,
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the NVRAM launch time of SvTPM is about 2600+ times faster than
that of vTPMs built upon hardware TPM.
The reason is that the vTPM architecture based on hardware
TPM has two performance limitations compared to the SGX-based
SvTPMarchitecture. First, the vTPMarchitecture based on hardware
TPM needs to decrypt the key first and then decrypt NVRAM file
with the key in two steps, while in SvTPM, only one step is needed
to decrypt NVRAM file. Second, the step of password decryption
needs to interact with the hardware TPM. Since the hardware TPM
is a low-speed device, performance loss in this stage is significantly
large.
5.3 Performance of TPM Commands
In order to test the performance of SvTPM, several commands com-
monly used in TPM were selected and tested on vTPM, SvTPM
and hardware TPM respectively. Here, vTPM refers to vTPM archi-
tecture without SGX protection. In order to obtain more accurate
experimental results, we use an average of 100 times of executions
for performance evaluation.
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Figure 8: Performance of Creating RSA Keys. The SvTPM
speed of creating RSA keys is about 110 times faster than
that of the hardware TPM.
Figure 8 shows the cost of creating an RSA key in three environ-
mental settings. Creating an RSA key in TPM consists of finding
prime numbers, creating public and private parts of the key, and
encrypting the private part with the root key. Creating an RSA key
is a relatively time-consuming operation in physical TPM, which
took an average of 5.17 seconds in the tested physical TPM, com-
pared to 42.44 ms in vTPM and 47.19 ms in SvTPM. We can see
that time consumption of this command can be greatly reduced in
the vTPM. According to our analysis, the advantages of the vTPM
environment are mainly in two aspects. First, the speed of generat-
ing random numbers is faster than that of hardware TPM. Second,
the process of verifying prime numbers in the virtual environment
can take advantage of the computing power of CPU to bring sig-
nificant performance improvement. In addition, we can see that
the time consumption of SvTPM is about 4.7ms more than that of
vTPM without SGX protection, which brings about 11% additional
performance overhead.
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Figure 9: Performance of Common Commands. The signa-
ture speed of SvTPM is about 13 times faster than hardware
TPM.
Figure 9 shows the results of testing other four main operations
including seal, unseal, sign, and verify. It is obvious that vTPM and
SvTPM can significantly reduce the time loss in the sign operation.
The signature speed of SvTPM is about 13 times faster than that
of the hardware TPM. The benefits of the virtual environment are
not apparent in the other three operations, even though the unseal
operation consumes a little more time than that in physical TPM.
In addition, we can see that the performance of vTPM and SvTPM
in these four commands are competitive. This indicates that SvTPM
only brings little overhead to these operations.
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Figure 10: Performance of Encryption and Decryption. The
decryption speed of SvTPM is about 12 times faster than the
hardware TPM.
Figure 10 depicts results of testing encryption and decryption op-
erations of both AES and RSA. The results are similar to the results
shown in Figure 9. SvTPM and vTPM offer significant performance
improvements in the RSA decryption, which is about 12 times faster
than that of the hardware TPM. However, the AES encryption and
decryption in SvTPM and vTPM perform a little worse than those
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in hardware TPM. Finally, in terms of RSA encryption, SvTPM and
vTPM can provide about 35% performance improvement.
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Figure 11: Performance of PCR Read and PCR Extend.
Figure 11 depicts the test results of three different architectures
in PCR-related operations. From the figure, we can see that hard-
ware TPM spends a little more time on PCR read and PCR extend,
and vTPM and SvTPM have similar performance in these two oper-
ations.
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Figure 12: Performance of BitLocker encryption and decryp-
tion.
In addition to testing the basic TPM commands, we also tested
the impact of different architectures on real applications. As shown
in Figure 12, we tested the performance of BitLocker in Windows.
In our test environment, we allocated an additional 2GB hard drive
for Windows and tested the performance of BitLocker encryption
and decryption for the drive in three different architectures. The
evaluation results are shown in Figure 12. As can be seen from the
figure, BitLocker takes longer to do encryption than do decryption
on the whole. In addition, among the three architectures, physical
TPM takes the most time, vTPM takes the least time, and the per-
formance of SvTPM is in the middle. The reason is that the keys
for disk encryption and decryption are protected by TPM SRK.
From the above analysis, we can draw a conclusion that the
command execution time of SvTPM is equal to or better than the
existing schemes. Hence, it is worth considering SvTPM, which
also provides run-time security protection for vTPMs in cloud.
5.4 Memory Usage
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Figure 13: Memory Usage. The memory consumption of
SvTPM is less than half of that of vTPM 2.0 MiniOS Xen.
In terms of memory consumption, we evaluate vTPM architec-
ture in Xen. The vTPM architecture in Xen requires a MiniOS to
run vTPM instances, which result in the need to occupy both Min-
iOS and vTPM memory. The experimental results are shown in
Figure 13, which depicts that the memory consumption of SvTPM
is less than half of the vTPM architecture in Xen.
6 DISCUSSION
Relationship between TPM and SGX. SvTPM aims at providing
a secure virtual TPM using SGX in the cloud. There is a question
about whether we still need TPMs when SGX can be used. In our
opinion, TPM and SGX are complementary technologies. TPM with
trusted computing technology can be used to measure the integrity
of the whole computing environment from the underlying BIOS,
operating systems to the upper applications. While SGX technology
can build isolated containers so as to ensure the run-time security
for key applications. If these two technologies are used together,
the security of the real system can be greatly improved.
TCB of SvTPM. In SvTPM, the SGX mechanism and the key
modules of vTPM, such as Libtpms 2.0 and NVRAM, works as TCB.
However, we assume hypervisor or VMM is benign-but-vulnerable,
because virtual machine management operations, such as creation,
stop and destruction, are controlled by the hypervisor in the cloud.
If we assume that hypervisor or VMM is completely untrusted, the
management operations of VMs and vTPMs, such as creation, are
completely untrusted. That is actually impractical in a real cloud
platform. Hence, we assume that hypervisor or VMM is benign-
but-vulnerable in our SvTPM system.
Trust path between the SvTPM enclave and the VM. In
SvTPM, although we are able to ensure that the TPM command is
executed safely within the enclave and the credentials of vTPM can
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Table 1: Comparison Between SvTPM and Other Similar Works
Solution Trust Anchor Supported Architecture Secure Storage NVRAM Replacement Protection Trust Establishment Rollback Attacks Protection Fine-grained Trusted Clock
TPM [21] TPM Physical PC Physical NVRAM N/A TPM N/A ✓
fTPM [35] TrustZone ARM eMMC RPMB N/A N/A ✓ ×
eTPM [41] TPM+SGX Xen Sealing N/A TPM→ SGX→ eTPM × ×
tpmsgx [42] SGX Container Sealing N/A N/A N/A ×
SvTPM SGX KVM/QEMU Sealing ✓ SGX→ SvTPM ✓ ✓
* N/A: the feature is not considered or not explicitly elaborated in the work.
not be leaked, the execution results ultimately need to be sent to
the upper layer VM from SvTPM enclave. Because the enclave does
not cover the entire communication path, there is still a risk that
the execution results can be tampered with after being delivered by
enclave. This issue can be resolved through a secure channel, such
as SSL channel, between the enclave and the VM. Meanwhile, this
method may incur an additional performance overhead.
7 RELATEDWORKS
vTPM is a virtual TPM instance, which is used in a virtual envi-
ronment (e.g. cloud computing platform), to build trust computing
base. The most important work about virtual TPM is that Stefan
Berger et al. [5] from IBM design and implement a vTPM system on
a XEN-based virtual platform. They virtualize TPM by extending
the standard TPM command set to support vTPM life-cycle man-
agement and extend vTPM trust to a hardware TPM in the virtual
environment. Frederic Stumpf et al. [40] propose a scheme to build
a trusted virtual platform. They bind vTPM with physical TPM, and
construct of vTPM certificate chain. Their solution uses the AIK
to sign virtual AIK (vAIK), physical PCR, nonce, and time-stamp,
which are then used to form vAIK certificates. Paul England and
Jork Loeser [14] extend the hypervisor with virtual PCR (vPCR) and
TPM context manager. This approach allows guest operating sys-
tems to share hardware TPM. But the number of virtual machines
on a physical machine is uncertain. Thus, this approach suffers
from performance bottleneck due to the limited memory space
of TPM. Matthew Fioravante and Daniel De Graaf [16] present
a virtual trusted platform module for Shielded VMs, which uses
a light VM (i.e. MiniOS) to isolate vTPM in Xen platform. Every
virtual machine has a dedicated VM as vTPM. Meanwhile, their
work still uses a physical TPM to provide the identity trust for the
vTPM. Virtin Spector [24] propose to put vTPM to SMM mode so
as to provide the isolation for the vTPM. However, this method
has a higher performance overhead because entering SMM mode
requires suspending all other CPU cores. cTPM [8] presents an
extension of the TPM’s design that adds an additional root key to
the TPM and shares that root key with the cloud. Therefore, cloud
users can create and share TPM-protected keys and data across
multiple devices they own.
The most related works to SvTPM are eTPM [41], fTPM [35] and
tpmsgx [42]. Their main difference are analyzed and depicted in
Table 1.
eTPM [41] designs a new trusted cloud platform security com-
ponent enclave TPM to protect cloud. Both SvTPM and eTPM are
built upon Intel SGX. However, they are different in several aspects:
(1) eTPM relies on physical TPM chips, but SvTPM does not use
TPM chips, improving runtime performance; and (2) eTPM does
not present and solve the security challenges for vTPM protection,
such as NVRAM replacement attacks, rollback attacks to vTPM and
secure clock.
fTPM [35] presents a design of a firmware-based TPM, which
leverages ARM TrustZone. They analyze security guarantees and
shortcomings of the ARM TrustZone technology and then present
three approaches to overcome the limitations of ARM TrustZone.
fTPM is mainly for ARM-based mobile devices, not for vTPMs in
cloud environments. Although fTPM also stores the TPM states
on untrusted storage, its challenges and solutions are different
compared with our solution, especially considering NVRAM re-
placement attacks and trust establishment between vTPM and SGX
platform.
Dave Tian et al. [42] presents lxcsgx, which allows SGX appli-
cations to run inside containers. This solution puts a software-
based TPM to an SGX enclave. However, compared with their work,
SvTPM presents and resolves a number of crucial security chal-
lenges when providing secure vTPMs for cloud tenants using SGX.
In addition, SvTPM can support KVM/QEMU architecture, TPM 2.0
specification, and many cryptographic algorithms.
Heaven [4] leverages SGX and Drawbridge, a sandbox, to pro-
vide an isolated PICO process container. It implements the shielded
execution of unmodified legacy applications in an untrusted cloud.
The system library and shield modules are put in SGX enclaves.
The system library interacts with Drawbridge host through Down-
calls and Upcalls to complete system functions required by user
programs. Shield module is responsible for checking function pa-
rameters and returns results to ensure secure execution of user
programs. SCONE [2] proposes a secure Docker container based on
SGX. It supports user-level threads and asynchronous system calls
to reduce the high-performance overhead due to thread synchro-
nization and system calls in the SGX enclave. Graphene-SGX [43]
implements a number of improvements to make security benefits
of SGX more usable, such as the integrity support for dynamically-
loaded libraries, and secure multi-process so as to rapidly deploy
unmodified applications on SGX with small overheads. VC3 [36]
presents a trusted computing environment for big data based on
SGX technology to ensure the data security of computation and
storage. It seals the data and code of users, and then the cloud
operating system loads the data and code into an isolated enclave.
Furthermore, an efficient distributed job execution protocol is pro-
posed to ensure the correctness and confidentiality of MapReduce
jobs in all computing nodes.
The above works leverage SGX for building a secure computing
environment for key applications. In contrast, SvTPM focuses on
protecting the key security modules, vTPM, using SGX in the cloud.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we highlight limitations of the state-of-the-art vTPM
protection solutions, such as lacking run-time security protection
and low performance, due to relying on the hardware TPM chip and
weak isolation mechanism. We then propose a secure and efficient
software-based vTPM, SvTPM, to address the challenges including
NVRAM replacement attacks, rollback attacks, trust establishment
between vTPMs and SGX platform, and the secure clock by us-
ing SGX to protect vTPMs. We implement an SvTPM prototype
system and evaluate its performance. The evaluation results show
that SvTPM has better performance and provides strong run-time
isolation protection for vTPMs in the cloud.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. D. Joseph, R. Katz, A. Konwinski, G. Lee,
D. Patterson, A. Rabkin, I. Stoica, and M. Zaharia. A view of cloud computing.
Communications of the ACM, 53(4):50–58, 2010.
[2] S. Arnautov, B. Trach, F. Gregor, T. Knauth, A. Martin, C. Priebe, J. Lind,
D. Muthukumaran, D. O’keeffe, M. Stillwell, D. Goltzsche, D. Eyers, K. Rüdi-
ger, and C. Fetzer. SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX. In OSDI,
volume 16, pages 689–703, 2016.
[3] Steven A Bade, Charles Douglas Ball, Ryan Charles Catherman, James Patrick
Hoff, and James Peter Ward. Scalable paging of platform configuration registers,
January 26 2010. US Patent 7,653,819.
[4] A. Baumann, M. Peinado, and G. Hunt. Shielding applications from an untrusted
cloud with haven. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 33(3):8, 2015.
[5] S. Berger, R. CÃąceres, K. A. Goldman, R. Perez, R. Sailer, and L. Van Doorn.
vTPM: virtualizing the trusted platform module. In Proc. 15th Conf. on USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 305–320, 2006.
[6] Stefan Brenner, Colin Wulf, David Goltzsche, Nico Weichbrodt, Matthias Lorenz,
Christof Fetzer, Peter Pietzuch, and Rüdiger Kapitza. Securekeeper: confidential
zookeeper using intel sgx. In Proceedings of the 17th International Middleware
Conference, page 14. ACM, 2016.
[7] S. Cen and B. Zhang. Trusted Time and Monotonic Counters with Intel Software
Guard Extensions Platform Services. Intel Corporation White Paper, 2017.
[8] C. Chen, H. Raj, S. Saroiu, and A. Wolman. cTPM: A Cloud TPM for Cross-Device
Trusted Applications. In NSDI, pages 187–201, 2014.
[9] G. Chen, W. Wang, T. Chen, S. Chen, Y. Zhang, X. Wang, T.-H. Lai, and D. Lin.
Racing in hyperspace: closing hyper-threading side channels on SGX with con-
trived data races. In Racing in Hyperspace: Closing Hyper-Threading Side Channels
on SGX with Contrived Data Races. IEEE, 2018.
[10] S. Chen, X. Zhang, M. K. Reiter, and Y. Zhang. Detecting privileged side-channel
attacks in shielded execution with Déjá Vu. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on
Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 7–18. ACM,
2017.
[11] V. Costan and S. Devadas. Intel SGX Explained. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2016(086):1–118, 2016.
[12] J. Cucurull and S. Guasch. Virtual TPM for a secure cloud: fallacy or reality?
2014.
[13] W. Dai, Y. Du, H. Jin, W. Qiang, D. Zou, S. Xu, and Z. Liu. RollSec: Automatically
Secure Software States Against General Rollback. International Journal of Parallel
Programming, pages 1–18, 2017.
[14] P. England and J. Loeser. Para-Virtualized TPM Sharing. In Trusted Computing -
Challenges and Applications, pages 119–132. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2008.
[15] Frederic F. Stumpf and C. Eckert. Enhancing trusted platform modules with
hardware-based virtualization techniques. In Emerging Security Information,
Systems and Technologies, 2008. SECURWARE’08. Second International Conference
on, pages 1–9. IEEE, 2008.
[16] Matthew Fioravante and Daniel De Graaf. The virtual Trusted Platform Module
(vTPM) subsystem for Xen. https://xenbits.xen.org/docs/4.6-testing/misc/vtpm.t
xt, Nov 2012.
[17] M. Foley. vSphere 6.7 âĂŞ Virtual Trusted Platform Modules. https://blogs.vmwa
re.com/vsphere/2018/05/vsphere-6-7-virtual-trusted-platform-modules.html,
May 2018.
[18] Y. Fu, E. Bauman, R. Quinonez, and Z. Lin. Sgx-Lapd: Thwarting Controlled Side
Channel Attacks Via Enclave Verifiable Page Faults. In International Symposium
on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, pages 357–380. Springer, 2017.
[19] Trusted Computing Group. TPM Library Specification, Family "2.0", Level 00,
Revision 01.38. https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-speci
fication/.
[20] Trusted Computing Group. TPM Main Specifiction Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision
116. https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main-specification/.
[21] Trusted Computing Group. Trusted Platform Module(TPM) Summary. White
Paper, Apr 2008.
[22] D. Gruss, J. Lettner, F. Schuster, O. Ohrimenko, I. Haller, and M. Costa. Strong and
efficient cache side-channel protection using hardware transactional memory. In
USENIX Security Symposium, pages 217–233, 2017.
[23] Seunghun Han, Wook Shin, Junhyeok Park, and Hyoungchun Kim. A bad dream:
Subverting trusted platform module while you are sleeping. In 27th USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 1229–1246, 2018.
[24] Yan Fei. Shi Xiang. Li Zhihua. Wang Juan. Zhang Huanguo. Virtinspector: A uefi
based dynamic secure measurement framework for virtual machine. Journal of
Sichuan University(Engineering Science Edition), 46(1):22–28, 2014.
[25] Intel. Intel Software Guard Extensions. https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx/.
[26] Intel. Intel Software Guard Extensions Developer Guide, May 2018.
[27] Intel. Intel Software Guard Extensions SDK for Linux* OS Developer Reference,
September 2018.
[28] S. Johnson, S. Vinnie, R. Carlos, B. Ernie, and M. Frank. Intel Soft-
ware Guard Extensions: EPID Provisioning and Attestation Service.
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/57/0e/ww10-2016
-sgx-provisioning-and-attestation-final.pdf, 2016.
[29] F. J. Krautheim, D. S. Phatak, and A. T. Sherman. Introducing the trusted virtual
environment module: a new mechanism for rooting trust in cloud computing.
In International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing, pages 211–227.
Springer, 2010.
[30] D. Liu, J. Lee, J. Jang, S. Nepal, and J. Zic. A cloud architecture of virtual trusted
platform modules. In 2010 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Embedded and
Ubiquitous Computing, pages 804–811. IEEE, 2010.
[31] F. Lombardi and R. Di Pietro. Secure virtualization for cloud computing. Journal
of network and computer applications, 34(4):1113–1122, 2011.
[32] S. Matetic, M. Ahmed, K. Kostiainen, A. Dhar, D. Sommer, A. Gervais, A. Juels, and
S. Capkun. ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2017:48, 2017.
[33] J. Van Bulckand M. Minkin, O. Weisse, D. Genkin, B. Kasikci, F. Piessens, M. Sil-
berstein, T. F. Wenisch, Y. Yarom, and R. Strackx. Foreshadow: Extracting the
Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution. In 27th
USENIX Security Symposium, pages 991–1008, 2018.
[34] C. Nemnonm. How To Enable Virtual TPM(vTPM) in Windows Server 2016
Hyper-V. https://charbelnemnom.com/2017/03/how-to-enable-virtual-tpm-vt
pm-in-windows-server-2016-hyper-v-vm-hyperv-ws2016/, Apr 2018.
[35] H. Raj, S. Saroiu, A. Wolman, R. Aigner, J. Cox, P. England, C. Fenner, K. Kinshu-
mann, J. Loeser, D. Mattoon, M. Nystrom, D. Robinson, R. Spiger, S. Thom, and
D. Wooten. fTPM: A Software-Only Implementation of a TPM Chip. In USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 841–856, 2016.
[36] F. Schuster, M. Costa, C. Fournet, C. Gkantsidis, M. Peinado, G. Mainar-Ruiz, and
M. Russinovich. VC3: Trustworthy data analytics in the cloud using SGX. In
Security and Privacy (SP), 2015 IEEE Symposium on, pages 38–54. IEEE, 2015.
[37] J. Shao, Y. Qin, D. Feng, and W. Wang. Formal analysis of enhanced authorization
in the TPM 2.0. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security, pages 273–284. ACM, 2015.
[38] M.-W. Shih, S. Lee, T. Kim, andM. Peinado. T-SGX: Eradicating controlled-channel
attacks against enclave programs. In Proceedings of the 2017 Annual Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), San Diego, CA, 2017.
[39] S. Shinde, Z. L. Chua, V. Narayanan, and P. Saxena. Preventing page faults
from telling your secrets. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 317–328. ACM, 2016.
[40] F. Stumpf,M. Benz,M. Hermanowski, and C. Eckert. An approach to a trustworthy
system architecture using virtualization. In International Conference on Autonomic
and Trusted Computing, pages 191–202. Springer, 2007.
[41] H. Sun, R. He, Y. Zhang, R. Wang, W. Ip, and K. Yung. eTPM: A Trusted Cloud Plat-
form Enclave TPM Scheme Based on Intel SGX Technology. Sensors, 18(11):3807,
2018.
[42] Dave Tian, Joseph I Choi, Grant Hernandez, Patrick Traynor, and Kevin R B
Butler. A practical intel sgx setting for linux containers in the cloud. 2019.
[43] C.-C. Tsai and D. E. Porterand M. Vij. Graphene-SGX: A practical library OS for
unmodified applications on SGX. In 2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
(USENIX ATC), 2017.
[44] A. Whitaker, M. Shaw, and S. D. Gribble. Denali: Lightweight virtual machines
for distributed and networked applications. Technical report, Technical Report
02-02-01, University of Washington, 2002.
[45] Y. Xia, Y. Liu, H. Chen, and B. Zang. Defending against VM rollback attack.
In Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN-W), 2012 IEEE/IFIP 42nd
International Conference on, pages 1–5. IEEE, 2012.
[46] M. Zimmerman. Virtual Trusted Platform Module for Shielded VMs: security in
plaintext. https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/virtual-trusted-platform-
module-for-shielded-vms-security-in-plaintext, Jul 2018.
13
